Three developments taking place in rapid succession in Europe point in the same direction: “strategic autonomy” is no longer just a slogan. It is becoming part of the new rules of technology and trade.

(1) France’s move to replace non-European tools such as Zoom and Microsoft Teams in public administration with French or European alternatives reflects not only concerns about data security but also a determination to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. (2) At the same time, the EU is preparing to strengthen a “Made in EU” approach, particularly in the automotive industry, through incentives and public procurement. (3) The EU–India free trade agreement is also reshaping the dynamics of access to European markets.

Where will Türkiye stand in Europe’s new protectionist, green industrial-policy regime? How should we respond as competition becomes tougher?

We must first take the wave of digital sovereignty seriously. Türkiye had already begun exploring this issue in recent years through its discourse of “domestic and national” technology. Minimum standards for domestic or European-compatible solutions should be established for the cloud, communications, and identity infrastructure used by public services and critical infrastructure. Requirements for domestic hosting, independent security audits, and supplier diversification should be incorporated into public procurement.

The aim should not be simply to “ban” foreign products, but to make the domestic ecosystem competitive in scale, trustworthiness, and usability. Prohibition can also trap local suppliers behind protective walls, producing an artificial and temporary complacency. As the government serves as a reference customer and creates demand, shared service layers that reduce SMEs’ switching costs, consolidated purchasing, and open standards should also be introduced.

“Made in EU” appears likely to become not just a label in the automotive sector but a practical condition of eligibility. If local-content requirements tighten for EU incentives, fleet purchases, batteries, and charging infrastructure, vehicles and components manufactured in Türkiye could lose their competitive advantages even when they retain market access. Our automotive strategy should accelerate domestic capabilities in critical components—batteries, power electronics, software, sensors, and advanced materials—while establishing a system of “compliance engineering” that incorporates EU requirements from the design stage onward. Product passports, traceability, carbon accounting, and supply-chain transparency are emerging as new parameters of export competitiveness.

The EU–India agreement may deepen the asymmetries of Türkiye’s Customs Union with the EU. Agreements between the EU and third countries can generate competitive pressure in the Turkish domestic market unless Türkiye concludes comparable agreements with those countries. Industrial products that enter into free circulation in the EU may also reach Türkiye more easily. The response should include pursuing our own trade agreement with India, securing mechanisms for coordination and consultation in the modernization of the Customs Union, and institutionalizing rapid market surveillance, rules-of-origin verification, and effective trade-defense capabilities in vulnerable sectors.

For Türkiye to become Europe’s reliable production and technology partner in this new era, digital sovereignty, industrial content, and asymmetries in trade need to be managed as parts of a single competitiveness architecture.