As artificial intelligence and robotic automation spread rapidly under the pressure to compete globally, how will Türkiye prevent employment and workers’ well-being from eroding? The state has to hit two targets at once: closing the productivity gap with these technologies while ensuring that productivity gains do not turn into an employment shock.

Achieving these two partly conflicting goals at the same time is not easy. If the gains accrue mainly to capital, labour income weakens and demand contracts. Economic growth may fail to offset the loss and productivity gains can even end up choking growth. In that sense, a disaster scenario could arise less from the technology itself than from a poorly managed transition.

As of January 2026, seasonally adjusted unemployment stands at 8.1 percent, employment at 31.95 million, and labour force participation at 52.1 percent. Youth unemployment is 14.3 percent and women’s labour force participation is 34.7 percent. Underutilised labour is 29.9 percent, informal employment is around 26.1 percent and concentrated largely in agriculture. Services account for roughly 55 percent of total employment. This picture shows that serious labour-market risks exist even before the transition accelerates.

In such a transition, the first move should be to redesign work. A governance approach that positions AI inside firms as decision support rather than a decision maker both reduces the risk of high-cost errors and lowers the pressure to remove humans from the system entirely. That requires developing regulation and supervisory methods in critical sectors.

The second move should be to deploy instruments that spread job losses over time. Work-sharing mechanisms similar to short-time work, wage insurance, and sectoral transition grants are therefore crucial. Supporting AI literacy across the workforce throughout the process is also necessary. These tools should be designed to ease the adjustment period for firms and workers.

The third move should be to protect the demand base. If productivity gains rise while the income base narrows, competitiveness itself becomes unsustainable. Even export-oriented sectors such as white goods will be affected by weaker domestic demand, because shrinking demand hits SMEs and supply chains. The tax mix should be rebalanced from wages toward rents, digital rents should be taxed more effectively, and the demand infrastructure that makes growth possible should be secured through targeted cash support or universal basic services. Care, health, basic education, and transport should be considered within this framework. This would mean a fundamental shift away from Türkiye’s rent-seeking economic model.

The fourth move should be to distribute productivity gains across a broader base. A gradual reduction in working hours, debates around a four-day week or 30 to 32 hours per week, is not a change the market will deliver on its own. It can become feasible only with minimum standards and incentives set by the state. If designed well, the distribution of productivity gains can improve and the social cost can be managed.

In countries that undergo this transition without maintaining such a balance, it is highly likely that the widespread poverty and social tensions seen at the outset of the Industrial Revolution and captured in novels will return in an even harsher form.